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Abstract: The need for multi-scalar analysis of energy and low-carbon systems is becoming 15 
more apparent as a way to assess the holistic socioeconomic and environmental impacts of 16 
energy transitions across a variety of scales and lifecycle stages.  This paper conducts a whole 17 
systems energy justice analysis of four European low-carbon transitions—nuclear power in 18 
France, smart meters in Great Britain, electric vehicles in Norway, and solar photovoltaic 19 
panels in Germany. It asks: in what ways may each of these transitions result in injustices that 20 
extend beyond communities and countries, i.e., across the whole system?  It utilizes a mixed-21 
methods research design based on 64 semi-structured research interviews with experts 22 
across all four transitions, five public focus groups, and the collection of 58 comments from 23 
twelve public internet forums to answer this question.  Drawing inductively from these data, 24 
the paper identifies and analyzes 44 injustices spread across three spatial scales. Micro scale 25 
injustices concern immediate local impacts on family livelihood, community health and the 26 
environment. Meso scale injustices include national-scale issues such as rising prices for 27 
electricity and gas associated or unequal access to low-carbon technology. Macro scale 28 
injustices include global issues such as the extraction of minerals and metals and the 29 
circulation of waste flows. The paper then discusses these collective injustices in terms of 30 
their spatiality and temporality, before offering conclusions for energy and climate research 31 
and policy.  32 
 33 
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1. Introduction 43 
In the midst of climate change, low-carbon transitions are underway in several 44 
countries. In this paper, our aim is to explore four ongoing European low-carbon transitions—45 
Whole systems energy justice 2 
 
nuclear power in France, smart meters in Great Britain, electric vehicles (EVs) in Norway, and 46 
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels in Germany—from an integrated whole systems and energy 47 
justice perspective. We ask: in what ways do each of these transitions result in injustices that 48 
extend beyond the geographic location of the transition, i.e., beyond the individual 49 
community or country, and across the whole lifecycle or system? Our mixed-methods 50 
research design is based on 64 semi-structured research interviews with experts across all 51 
four transitions, five public focus groups, and the collection of 58 comments from twelve 52 
public internet forums. 53 
The paper is structured as follows.  It first introduces our multi-scalar whole systems 54 
and energy justice conceptual framework, and then it describes our three primary research 55 
methods (interviews, focus groups, and internet forums) across the four countries. Drawing 56 
from these data, it inductively identifies and analyses 44 injustices involving three scales.  As 57 
we explain in greater detail, micro scale injustices concern aspects that impact on local 58 
people, communities and the environment at close proximity to the energy transition or 59 
technology in question.  Meso injustices encompass more national level impacts on policy, 60 
prices, infrastructure, and markets.  Macro injustices relate to transnational scale impacts 61 
that go beyond nation states and relate to global supply chains and externalities. The paper 62 
then discusses these 44 combined injustices in terms of their spatiality and temporality, 63 
before offering conclusions and implications for energy and climate research and policy.  64 
In proceeding on this path, we hope to make three contributions.  The first is more 65 
empirical and methodological.  Reviews of the energy justice field, such as those offered in 66 
Jenkins et al. (2016), Sovacool et al. (2017a), and McCauley et al. (2019), analyze a multitude 67 
of studies either drawing on a single case study (if they have a case study at all) or offering 68 
conceptual insights not grounded in empirical data.  If they do have empirical data, it may be 69 
from experts, or members of the public, but not both. We seek to address this gap head on 70 
by offering a comparative assessment (examining four countries or case studies) using 71 
original mixed methods data collected from the “real world” via interviews, focus groups, and 72 
internet forums from a mix of experts and the public.     73 
Second, we seek to humanize the issue of low-carbon transitions and also to reveal 74 
their underlying political economies, or trade-offs.  In very simple terms: it is not only fossil 75 
fuels or large-scale systems such as hydroelectricity that can generate their own injustices; 76 
solar energy, nuclear power, smart meters and EVs can erode justice principles or create 77 
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justice concerns as well.  Dominish et al. (2019) as well as Jenkins et al. (2018), Xu and Chen 78 
(2019), and Heffron and McCauley (2018), remind us that low-carbon transitions are not 79 
merely technical tasks, but socially, politically, and culturally challenging processes that must 80 
be managed in fairer and more equitable ways.  In line with this body of work, we seek to 81 
identify and reveal some of the ethical or moral dilemmas low-carbon transitions raise.  82 
Third, and more conceptually, we seek to explicitly build on, and operationalize, calls 83 
for a “whole systems” or “multi-scalar” approach to energy analysis as well as energy justice.  84 
Bickerstaff et al. (2013) as well as Jenkins et al. (2014), Jenkins et al. (2017), and Jenkins 85 
(2018) affirm that energy justice needs to unbound itself by focusing on the “whole system” 86 
of a given energy technology or transition.  Sovacool et al. (2017a) argue in particular that 87 
multi-scalar analyses of energy transitions are a core gap in the field and that they represents 88 
one of six “new frontiers” for research.  Similar calls for multi-scalar analysis of energy 89 
transitions, though not always using the terminology of energy justice, come from Bridge et 90 
al. (2013: 337), Bouzarovski and Simcock (2017: 464), Fuller and McCauley (2016: 3), and 91 
McLaren (2012).   Yet so far, multi-scalar energy research has been an emerging field within 92 
the energy social science community (Sovacool 2014).  Cross and Murray (2018: 102) claim, 93 
for example, that even when multi-scalar approaches to energy analysis are taken, they 94 
“have yet to fully empirically address actually existing renewable energy products and 95 
technologies across global supply chains and product life cycles.”  We therefore offer a 96 
unique conceptual approach isolating injustices across three spatial scales (micro, meso, and 97 
macro) as well as temporal lifecycle stages.  98 
2. Research design: Whole systems energy justice, case selection, and research methods 99 
 This section introduces the conceptual approach of this paper, which can be framed 100 
as one tying together whole systems thinking with energy justice. It then justifies the four 101 
case studies (France, Great Britain, Norway and Germany) and explains its research methods 102 
(interviews, focus groups, and internet forums). 103 
2.1 Conceptual approach: Whole systems energy justice  104 
In its most abstract conceptualization, a whole systems approach is about identifying 105 
the interactions between elements of a whole system to better comprehend, and perhaps 106 
change, the system itself; without such a systemic focus, critical components and synergies 107 
could be missed, distorting our view of system properties and obscuring implications for 108 
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efficiency or sustainability (Anarow et a. 2003). However, in contrast to more conventional 109 
whole systems thinking in energy studies that has often focused narrowly on finding novel 110 
ways to reduce cost and maximize efficiency across the production life-cycle, Stansinoupolos 111 
et al. (2013: 3) argue that a whole systems approach must tackle multiple objectives as “a 112 
process through which the interconnections between subsystems and system are actively 113 
considered”.  114 
Unlike more formal lifecycle assessment, data envelopment analysis, or supply chain 115 
analysis, our whole systems approach extends its focus beyond a concern for cost, carbon or 116 
efficiency to embrace wider objectives such as affordability, security and social sustainability. 117 
Indeed, as McLaren (2012: 7) argues, whole systems analysis of energy systems should 118 
consider both the “entire life-cycle and the wider contextual environment” within which the 119 
technical system is located. Thus, rather than seeing technological and innovation processes 120 
as a closed loop divorced from social and cultural context, our conceptualization of a whole 121 
energy system means recognizing, foremost, that the origins, character, and effects of energy 122 
technologies are embedded within broader economic, social, and environmental 123 
relationships that spill across time and space (Bickerstaff et al. 2013; Bridge et al. 2018a).  124 
Our approach to whole systems thinking is therefore best captured by Castán-Broto 125 
and Baker’s (2018: 3) notion of a relational approach: one that “prompts the need to ask 126 
systemic questions that cut across energy, geography, and society including the patterns and 127 
scales of energy supply, distribution and consumption”. Such an effort “brings forward 128 
dimensions of justice, access and distribution and what this might mean for the requirements 129 
of space and territory” (Castán-Broto and Baker 2018: 3).  In this sense, our whole systems 130 
lens is focused on the ways in which social, economic, political, and environmental 131 
dimensions interact across multiple scales (local, national, and global) of the production, 132 
distribution, consumption, and disposal phases of the energy process (Jenkins et al. 2014).  In 133 
this spirit, Mulvaney (2013, 2014) is one of a few scholars to have taken such a multi-scalar 134 
approach, in his analyses of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels.   135 
 We couple whole systems thinking with energy justice, a normative analytical 136 
framework that demands an assessment of the costs, benefits, and procedures involved in 137 
energy decisions, pathways, and policies (Sovacool & Dworkin 2015; Sovacool et al. 2019).  138 
This can include consideration not only of vulnerability and exclusion but also those that 139 
benefit disproportionately from transitions processes (Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Healy and 140 
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Barry 2017).   We draw from Jenkins et al. (2016) who frame energy justice as asking a “what” 141 
question about the unjust impacts associated with energy systems and where they are 142 
located; “who” is most affected; and “how” do injustices become embedded in procedures or 143 
mechanisms. Energy justice therefore demands that we view the moral and ethical 144 
dimensions to energy alongside the usual technical, economic, political or, cultural ones.  It 145 
also underlines that winners and losers exist within the energy system and that even a low-146 
carbon transition can concentrate environmental hazards or unfair social outcomes among 147 
the vulnerable and geographically disadvantaged (Bridge et al. 2018b).  Here, we focus 148 
exclusively on injustices with the aim of making them more identifiable so that future 149 
research and policy can plan for and perhaps minimize them.   150 
In summary, when applied to the four low-carbon transitions we examine, whole 151 
systems thinking demands we look across spatial and temporal scales to understand the 152 
burdens and procedures that may systematize injustices (Healy et al., 2019). Energy justice 153 
meanwhile demands that we look at impacts on communities that are – or may become – 154 
vulnerable. We interpret this to mean we must look at multiple dimensions of a transition 155 
(technical, economic, social, political, etc.), multiple lifecycle stages of the technology 156 
involved (including material inputs, manufacturing, use, and disposal), and groups that may 157 
be or become vulnerable at multiple spatial scales or moments of the transition. Because 158 
numerous studies, including Alberini et al. (2018), Hiteva and Sovacool (2017), Balbus et al. 159 
(2014), Burke et al. (2018), Noel et al. (2018) and Ürge-Vorsatz et al. (2014), have already 160 
focused only on the benefits (or the positive justice co-benefits) of low carbon transitions, 161 
here we take a critical lens that seeks to examine and reveal injustices. Our whole systems-162 
energy justice approach is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 163 
 164 
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Source: Authors  171 
To operationalize our whole systems-energy justice approach, we utilize three 172 
analytical scales: micro, meso, and macro.  While these scales can be open to different 173 
interpretations, by micro scale, we refer to injustices that occur within a particular 174 
community or household that is located to close proximity to the energy innovation or 175 
system involved in the transition.  By meso scale, we refer to injustices that cover more 176 
national level consequences for policy, technology, or markets.  By macro, we refer to 177 
injustices that occur and circulate at the regional, transnational, and global scale.  This micro-178 
meso-macro framing has been used extensively in other fields, notably evolutionary 179 
economics (Dopfer et al. 2004), innovation studies and technology analysis (Jamison and 180 
Baark 1990), health studies (Kapiriri et al. 2007), and environmental studies (Liljenstrom and 181 
Svedin 2005), but has not been applied to energy justice analysis. We also draw on the 182 
transitions field, recognizing that low carbon transitions are geographically-constituted 183 
processes (Bridge et al., 2013), and that there is a need to go beyond nationally bounded 184 
case analysis (Raven et al., 2012). Even though we differentiate between micro, meso and 185 
macro scales, we recognize that these scales are interdependent, geographically uneven 186 
(Coenen et al., 2012), and that there is no necessary hierarchy between them.  Moreover, 187 
such terms are meant to convey a sense of spatial scale only, they are not meant to imply any 188 
absolute or relative degree of importance.  All three scales of injustice—micro, meso, and 189 
macro—are significant. 190 
2.2 Case study selection  191 
With our whole systems-energy justice approach established, we then sought to 192 
select four strong examples of European low-carbon transitions, e.g. areas where European 193 
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countries are regional or global leaders.  These can be regarded as leading case studies that 194 
offer a degree of temporal variation and different types of energy transitions (two supply 195 
oriented such as France and Germany, two focusing on end use devices such as Great Britain 196 
and Norway).   197 
France is well known for its nuclear power transition: with the second highest share of 198 
nuclear reactors in the world (after the United States) it is also the largest exporter of nuclear 199 
power in the world and is one of the largest recyclers of nuclear fuel (World Nuclear 200 
Association 2018). Although initially launched for economic and national security reasons, the 201 
French nuclear case has more recently been framed as a “low carbon energy transition” 202 
(Araújo 2017).   203 
Great Britain has one of the largest smart meter programs in the world and is 204 
currently seeking to install 56 million smart meters for electricity and gas in all homes and 205 
small businesses across England, Scotland and Wales by the end of 2020 (House of Commons 206 
Science and Technology Committee, 2016).  207 
Norway is the world leader for the per capita deployment of EVs; it has the highest 208 
annual growth rate of EVs in the world (up 57% from 2016 to 2017); and it has the highest 209 
market share in the world of EVs as a proportion of new car sales (International Energy 210 
Agency 2018).  211 
Germany has the greatest total installed capacity of solar PV per capita anywhere in 212 
the world and has also pushed decentralized solar generation among households, where 213 
more than 1.5 million residences have adopted their own solar PV system (German Federal 214 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 2017; Wittenberg and Matthies 2016: 200). These 215 
cases also represent different timescales of when national policies supporting the specific 216 
energy technologies were introduced (nuclear power in the 1970s, EVs in the 1990s, solar PV 217 
in 2000s, and smart meters in the 2010s). 218 
2.3 Mixed methods research design  219 
To collect original data across these four cases, we proceeded with a qualitative 220 
research design that used mixed methods across expert research interviews, public focus 221 
groups, and public internet forums.  We conducted 64 interviews with experts between June 222 
and August 2018, 16 for each of our case studies, with interviewees selected to represent a 223 
diverse mix of institutions such as those within: 224 
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 Industries, industry associations, and private sector firms such as Electricité de 225 
France, the German Solar Association (BSW-Solar), the Federation of 226 
Norwegian Industries, and Smart Energy GB in the United Kingdom; 227 
 Non-profit groups and civil society organizations such as Greenpeace in 228 
France, E3G in Germany, the Norwegian Electric Vehicle Association, and 229 
Citizens Advice in the United Kingdom;  230 
 Regulatory and government entities such as the Commissariat à l'Énergie 231 
Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (CEA) in France, Federal Ministry for 232 
Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany, the Ministry of Transport and 233 
Communications in Norway, and the Department for Business, Energy & 234 
Industrial Strategy in the United Kingdom;  235 
 Universities and academic institutes such as the ESSEC Business School in 236 
France, Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems in Germany, Norwegian 237 
University of Science and Technology in Norway, and the University of Oxford 238 
in the United Kingdom. 239 
In each interview, we asked (among other questions): “What do you see as some of the most 240 
significant costs or disadvantages to the energy transition being examined?” And, “Taking a 241 
whole systems perspective, who or what may be the biggest losers beyond Europe?”  The 242 
research interviews generally lasted between thirty and ninety minutes, were digitally 243 
recorded, and participants were guaranteed anonymity to protect their identity and 244 
encourage candor.  245 
 To supplement our expert interviews with public perceptions and experiences, we 246 
conducted five focus groups in non-capital areas of each country, namely Lewes (UK), Colmar 247 
(France), Freiburg (Germany, 2 groups), and Stavanger (Norway).  Unlike the interviews, which 248 
involved experts and were mostly done in national capitals, we intended the focus groups to 249 
capture public perceptions in non-urban areas.  As Figure 2 indicates, these were entirely open 250 
to the public, and we collected responses from a total of 15 participants.   251 
Figure 2: Focus group recruitment posters for Falmer, United Kingdom and Stavanger, Norway, 252 
September 2018  253 
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  254 
Source: Authors  255 
 256 
Lastly, to triangulate our interviews and focus groups, which were limited to Lewes, 257 
Colmar, Freiburg, and Stavanger, we posted research questions on twelve sector specific online 258 
internet forums summarized in Table 1. These internet forums had more than 2 million 259 
collective members, meaning they were open to a large block of possible respondents and 260 
helped hedge against the possible bias in our expert interviews and limited location of focus 261 
groups.  In other words, the forums were the method mostly accessible to the public.  In the 262 
forums, we asked: “What are the biggest advantages of low-carbon innovations such as smart 263 
meters/EVs/solar energy/nuclear power?  Who are the big recipients of those benefits or 264 
winners?” This resulted in 58 additional responses collected by the forums shown in Table 1. 265 




Norway Elbilforum.no Norwegian EV forum 
Tesla motors club Norway Online forum for Tesla owners in Norway 
SpeakEV Online electric car forum for all EV owners and 
enthusiasts 
Germany Photovoltaik forum.com A solar forum in German 
Solarstrom-forum.de A solar photovoltaic forum in German 
Building Technology Forum - Solar 
Energy 
Online forum for all building technologies 
including solar 
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United Kingdom Money Saving Expert Consumer forum  
Navitron Private company forum on a range of energy 
issues 
OVO Energy Private company forum on a range of energy 
issues 
France Que Choisir Consumer forum 
Forum photovoltaique Energy forum 
Droit Finances Consumer finances forum 
Source: Authors  267 
 After collection of the interview, focus group, and internet forum data, they were fully 268 
transcribed, and then coded by two researchers, with each respondent given a unique 269 
identifying number. Our coding scheme was exhaustive and inductive, meaning we coded 270 
every response and then analyzed the full sample using NVivo. 271 
2.4 Limitations  272 
Despite an attempt at triangulation within these methods, our approach does have 273 
some notable limitations.  Although the focus groups and internet forums were open to all 274 
members of the public, the number of responses collected was less than that of the expert 275 
interviews.  Our interview questions asked explicitly about “injustices,” but these can be real 276 
or perceived, historical or prospective, and they can vary by degree, i.e. encompassing issues, 277 
tensions, challenges, and costs.  What some consider an insult, injustice, or harmful act may 278 
be perceived by others as a mere inconvenience or annoyance.  What is important is that 279 
such aspects were nonetheless perceived as injustices by our respondents. We therefore do 280 
not want to marginalize respondents, or induce non-recognition (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2016), by 281 
seeking to challenge them on the severity of the injustices identified.    282 
Furthermore, due to the wealth of empirical material spread across four case studies, 283 
we did not have sufficient space in this study to also assess benefits, co-benefits, or positive 284 
synergies, or to conduct a rigorous literature review to contextualize or triangulate our 285 
findings, although we do explore those domains in other papers. 286 
Lastly, we did not make an attempt to weight, correct, normalize, or problematize 287 
data across our methods, to avoid censoring our results and discussion.  Perhaps some of 288 
these weaknesses, especially confirmation with the peer-reviewed literature or 289 
complementing our analysis with quantitative techniques, indicate directions for future 290 
research.  291 
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3. Results: The whole systems energy injustices of four transitions  292 
 In this section, we present our core results across the three methods (interviews, 293 
focus groups, and internet forums). Guided by the whole systems-energy justice approach, 294 
we explore environmental, social and economic injustices across three primary scales: micro 295 
scale (households and communities); meso scale (across a nation or subnational region); and 296 
macro scale (transnational, regional and global ramifications).  Admittedly, such scalar 297 
categories are relational, so here we ground the discussion with Europe as the central unit of 298 
analysis.  Such injustices would obviously be regarded at inverse scales in other areas (i.e., 299 
uranium mining would be macro to the French transition but micro to the communities 300 
hosting the mines).  The four respective low-carbon transitions in European countries are 301 
thus the geographical “anchors” for our analysis.  302 
3.1 French nuclear power 303 
 The injustices associated with nuclear power in France include micro issues such as 304 
risks facing communities living near nuclear infrastructure and waste, meso issues such as 305 
pollution and accident risks, and macro issues such as uranium mining and milling. 306 
3.1.1 Micro injustices  307 
 At the micro scale, respondents emphasized the scope and severity of local level 308 
environmental, health and economic impacts.  F001 focused on interrelated environmental 309 
impacts such as water consumption for cooling, nuclear waste, and health, stressing the 310 
strong spatial dimensions of these vulnerabilities: 311 
France will have to close down inland reactors as the rivers lose water volume, and 312 
you cannot get the cooling. We know what will happen to the reactors on the coast 313 
with rising sea levels as rising storm surge may flood and create nuclear islands … 314 
France’s radiological inventory, because of the weight of its nuclear power is 315 
enormous. I was up in Le Hague, and they have a waste problem even worse than the 316 
UK.  They are running out of space for intermediate storage.  Then, there are classic 317 
health and environmental vulnerabilities.  318 
F006 emphasized the local nature of these types of environmental and health impacts, 319 
stating that people living near nuclear plants were more exposed to nuclear risks than others, 320 
making it also a moral – and existential – burden for them. F014 meanwhile noted that for 321 
those living near nuclear plants, there was a trade-off between personal economic benefits 322 
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and nuclear risks, which could create vulnerability: "People have been manipulated into 323 
accepting potentially dangerous plants in their communities in exchange for jobs and 324 
investment, so potentially they are most vulnerable if there is an accident.” Other 325 
respondents talked about particular communities and sectors that had become vulnerable 326 
over time, such as those owning property near power plants. As F011 explained, “The 327 
problems are more visible and there is a moving population that is less connected to the 328 
plants. People who could afford it have moved away and the prices of property in the vicinity 329 
of plants has fallen, leaving those with homes disadvantaged.”  F006 contended that nuclear 330 
plants had impacted negatively on some agricultural sectors, notably wine making, with wine 331 
growers apparently “very resistant to nuclear development.” This point was also picked up by 332 
F011, who claimed that “wine growers in areas such as Bordeaux, whose vineyards were in 333 
the vicinity of plants were affected.  In other areas, such as Golfech, near Toulouse, there is 334 
radioactive material in the water supply.” As the second largest wine producer in the world 335 
(OIV, 2018), the French wine industry has a considerable reputation to protect.  336 
F002 suggested that such issues may be part of a systematized process of 337 
peripheralisation within France that creates natural vulnerabilities for certain communities, 338 
leading to “inequality” and community “ambivalence” to environmental threats. The issue of 339 
local environmental impacts was also raised in the focus group, with a respondent noting 340 
issues with radioactive leaks: “In the Rhone Valley, they have radioactive leaks, but this is not 341 
being reported. It remains a secret, they do not talk about it. But even at Fessenheim they 342 
have not minimized these problems.” This statement was confirmed by Institute for 343 
Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety in France (ISRN 2014). 344 
Micro scale injustices in the French nuclear case tended to dominate the discussions 345 
across all three respondent groups, which may reflect the fact that those interviewed view 346 
local threats most acutely since they are the most exposed to them. In the case of nuclear 347 
power, plants are often visible in local communities through a legacy of providing jobs and 348 
investment in local facilities, but also through local protests against nuclear waste 349 
management (F007) (see Figure 3).  350 
Figure 3: An “anti-nuclear power” emblem car sticker in Colmar, France, July 2018  351 
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Source: Authors  353 
3.1.2 Meso injustices 354 
 At the meso scale, respondents repeatedly referred to the risk of accidents and the 355 
potential ways in which France’s nuclear pathway has interfered with the development of 356 
other low-carbon innovations and transitions.   357 
In terms of accidents, F007 stated that accident risks threaten the whole of France, 358 
while in the internet forums, one participant noted: “The negatives to nuclear power in 359 
France are clear. They include the long-term and immediate ecological risk of a single nuclear 360 
accident.”  The risk of an accident is difficult to predict, but probabilistically could occur at 361 
any facility and at any time (Wheatley et al. 2017), with F007 stating that “They wanted to 362 
build 200 reactors, and we only built 58 and that is 58 opportunities for accidents!”.  363 
 A second important dimension relates to the ways in which the presence (and 364 
predominance) of French nuclear power potentially interferes and interrupts other energy 365 
transitions. As F007 explained: “Italy benefitted from cheap French nuclear electricity but that 366 
surely didn’t help it to build and develop its own sound strategy for its own energy system.” 367 
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F012 explained this dynamic in more detail, noting implicitly that it cuts across meso and 368 
macro scales: 369 
Because France delivers a lot of baseload power to its European neighbors, and the 370 
fact that France needs to protect its export industry, means that France has had to 371 
slow down the development of renewables in other countries. Moreover, the large 372 
amount of baseload France gives to other countries is slowing down the capacity of 373 
the grid to exchange the renewable surplus to other countries. For example, Spain and 374 
Portugal are completely blocked by the fact that they can’t have the flexibility of 375 
selling back to France. 376 
These meso scale injustices relate to nuclear accident risks affecting the whole of France 377 
despite the location of nuclear plants, and an impact on the wider renewable energy 378 
transition.  379 
3.1.3 Macro injustices  380 
At the macro, or global scale beyond Europe, respondents drew attention to the 381 
potential risks that nuclear accidents pose to countries beyond France and the transnational 382 
nature of environmental and social injustices, particularly those related to uranium mining 383 
and nuclear exports.  384 
In regards to the risk of nuclear accidents, F004 argued that these risks also go 385 
beyond national borders. This macro dimension was echoed also by F001, who stated that “if 386 
an accident happens, depending on which way the wind is blowing, that will determine who is 387 
affected,” with “The English Channel, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Scandinavians” all at risk. 388 
F007 also highlighted the risk of accidents for neighboring countries, especially regarding 389 
environmental injustices: 390 
Environmental accidents do not stop at the border. From an environmental justice 391 
perspective, a small country like Luxembourg could just disappear if Fessenheim has 392 
an accident! Belgium too! When we think about environmental justice we assume, in 393 
very economic terms, that it is only the polluters who will have to pay the costs, but a 394 
wider range of people will be affected. 395 
In terms of injustices related to mining, F011 for example stated that: “In Niger and 396 
Kazakhstan, there is the buying of uranium and the conditions of workers and the political 397 
systems there is a justice issue.” France uses approximately 12,400 tons of uranium oxide 398 
concentrate (10,500 tons of U) per year and imports this mainly from Canada (4,500 tons of 399 
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Uranium/year (tU/Y)) and Niger (3,200 tU/yr), with the rest coming from Australia, 400 
Kazakhstan and Russia (World Nuclear Association 2018). This issue of uranium extraction 401 
was also highlighted in the internet forums, where a respondent indicated: “The issue of the 402 
extraction of uranium is a serious risk, but that is also why we try not to talk too much about 403 
it!” F007 commented on the potential problems linked to selling nuclear technology to other 404 
counties that have more unstable political settlements and laxer environmental protocols: 405 
France has sold nuclear technology to countries where it was really a problem to 406 
implement. In a country with a strong democratic basis, at least you have strong 407 
governance and counter powers.  But in places like China, if tomorrow if there is a 408 
problem, it will be a disaster. In Russia, we are now sure that uranium is leaking and 409 
local surroundings have been heavily contaminated.  Regulatory bodies like the IAEA 410 
reflect the powerlessness of international governance, they have been completely 411 
unable to demand an inquiry. Essentially, France has shown to other countries that the 412 
centralization of political power is a prerequisite for the development of nuclear.  413 
French companies have tried to even sell nuclear technology to countries such as 414 
South Africa or Libya, under the Gadhafi regime. 415 
The macro scale injustices related to French nuclear power illustrate the geopolitical and 416 
transnational nature of the risks of the French nuclear industry, and the extent to which the 417 
impacts of decisions made in France have implications for other countries, notably those 418 
where resource extraction takes place.  419 
3.2 British smart meters 420 
 Our material identified various social, economic, and environmental injustices related 421 
to the British smart meter roll-out. Micro scale injustices related to the exclusion of rural 422 
areas and hard-to-reach groups, more expensive household bills, and added stress for 423 
families; meso injustices related to job losses in incumbent sectors; and macro injustices 424 
related to issues such as waste streams and the potential (and paradoxical) contribution of 425 
the program to global carbon emissions.  426 
3.2.1 Micro injustices 427 
Although the national smart meter program is attempting to minimize such instances, 428 
respondents suggested that there may nonetheless be inevitable geographic exclusions of 429 
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customers in some rural areas, particularly in Scotland, meaning that not everyone would 430 
benefit evenly from the smart meter program. As GB005 noted:  431 
There is quite a strong geographical inequality in what is going on.  It is unlikely that 432 
smart meter coverage works in rural and remote areas. At the moment, with SMETS 1 433 
[first generation] meters, you’re relying on the equivalent of cellular network coverage, 434 
which is just as unreliable as mobile phones in those areas … People in rural areas are 435 
going to miss out on the advantages to smart meters … In the highlands of Scotland, 436 
network coverage is terrible, and it’s the same with smart meters.  437 
GB006 even estimated that there was a proportion of homes that may be permanently 438 
unable to accommodate a smart meter due to their location: “Our analysis suggests that 85% 439 
of homes fit the needed categories of being able to adopt smart meters—they have the 440 
necessary networks, meter availability, etc.  But the other 15% in rural areas or a block of flats 441 
are excluded by those criteria.”  These hard-to-reach groups also potentially include people 442 
living in mobile homes and those living in certain apartment blocks (GB015). They may also 443 
include lower income people who cannot afford to acquire – or who do not have access to – 444 
supporting innovations, such as automated appliances or smart homes.  Potential exclusion 445 
was also mentioned in our internet forums, where respondents thought that limited access 446 
to mobile network coverage could lead to the non-functionality of meters: “Smart meters do 447 
not work in areas with no or poor mobile data coverage.”  448 
Another important micro scale concern was that energy bills may become more 449 
expensive as a result of the smart meter program, particularly if people were not able to 450 
change or shift their energy demand. As GB010 explained: 451 
Via smart meters, certain people have more ability to respond to time of use tariffs, 452 
and have either more flexibility for them to shift their loads to other times, but also in 453 
terms of installing systems that will automatically do that on their behalf.  However, 454 
those people who do not respond to the changing tariffs structures could find 455 
themselves worse off.  456 
Respondents in the focus groups suggested that apart from negative monetary impacts on 457 
families, smart meters could also erode family unity and lead to tensions: “People with 458 
teenage children could suffer from smart meters. Teenagers use a lot of electricity if they have 459 
all got computers, playing games in their separate bedrooms. Possibly families with children 460 
could lose out, at the least it could cause tension!”  This theme was also mentioned in the 461 
Whole systems energy justice 17 
 
internet forums, with a respondent recounting a story about a smart meter leading to a fight 462 
with his wife because she had baked cakes and scones only to cause a “red light event.” 463 
In sum, the technical and geographical issues relating to smart meter access could 464 
potentially create a digital divide at the micro scale between those homes who have access 465 
to smart meters and those who do not, leaving some homes unable to access potential 466 
benefits from smart meters. Furthermore, the way in which consumers engage, or do not 467 
engage, with smart meters could have a profound impact on the way in which their bills take 468 
shape in the future. 469 
3.2.2 Meso injustices  470 
At the meso level, respondents discussed economic and environmental injustices, 471 
mainly in the form of raised overall energy bills, job losses, and the environmental impacts of 472 
the smart meter roll out (including carbon emissions from the installation process).   473 
 A significant number of respondents across all data sources expressed concerns about 474 
the expense of the national smart meter program. Although the up-front costs are being 475 
borne by suppliers, most suspected that consumers would end up paying for the program in 476 
the end. As GB001 summarized: “companies will have to pass on the costs somehow, so 477 
there’s clearly a justice/distributional thing there, with likely higher bills.” 478 
 On job losses, some suggested that incumbent actors in the “MOP and MAP” services 479 
would be major losers from the smart meter transition. This is an industry term that refers to 480 
different actors in the energy metering system: MOP refers to the “meter operator” and MAP 481 
refers to the “meter asset provider,” who is responsible for maintaining and installing 482 
metering equipment. We classify these as meso rather than micro since they affect primarily 483 
national energy companies across the entire country.  As GB007 stated: “As a direct loser in 484 
the transition, I suppose the meter readers will lose their jobs.” GB002 estimated to their 485 
knowledge that this would affect approximately 10,000 employees.  Taking a more system-486 
wide lens, GB012 hypothesized: “I suppose the losers of a sustainable, smart system are 487 
basically the gas industry, because we shouldn’t really be using gas after 2040, so then it’s 488 
more the kinds of people working in the gas networks, all the suppliers.” 489 
Although one of the ultimate aims of the smart meter program was an end to the 490 
carbon-intensive practice of meter-reading, a number of respondents commented on 491 
potential paradoxical rises in national carbon emissions that could result from the smart 492 
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meter roll-out, at least compared to a different programmatic design, with GB003 linking this 493 
environmental externality with the fragmented structure of the energy sector in the UK: 494 
The smart meter program in the UK is more complex than other countries. Those 495 
countries do it geographically, street by street. Here, in a street of 100 houses, you 496 
could have 100 different suppliers. It will be sporadic, because it involves 100 separate 497 
journeys, and using a lot of carbon driving around.  498 
GB006 also raised this issue, stating that: “An optimal way to deploy smart meters would have 499 
been street by street, town by town. Instead, here you have six different vans going to the 500 
same street, and therefore six times the environmental cost. You have vans full of meters 501 
driving up and down the country.”  502 
 The meso scale injustices of the smart meter roll out show how the practical delivery 503 
of low carbon solutions can cause unwanted impacts at national scale in regard to costs and 504 
emissions. While some of these are shorter lived (e.g. emissions linked to smart meter 505 
installations) other can have longer-term impacts (e.g. job losses).  506 
3.2.3 Macro injustices  507 
At the macro level, respondents emphasized potential environmental injustices linked 508 
to waste streams associated with the manufacturing of smart meters (and in-home displays) 509 
as well as afterlife issues related to old meters such as recycling and electronic waste. 510 
Perhaps reflecting the “invisible” nature of these global supply chain injustices, several 511 
respondents conceded that they had received little information about the manufacturing and 512 
recycling processes of the smart meter rollout (see also Alexander & Reno 2012; Sovacool et 513 
al. 2017). 514 
GB001 for example speculated about both the source – and end place – of smart 515 
meter components: “Smart meters involve a lot of ‘stuff’.  The materials impact could be 516 
considerable. And how much are you relying on metals from war torn countries?” GB008 put 517 
it this way: 518 
Where the actual hardware is being manufactured could be an injustice. I do not know 519 
where the meters are being manufactured nor where the meters that are being 520 
removed are being disposed of or recycled. From what I know about mobile phones, I 521 
suspect that it is quite an environmental and social burden, especially on countries 522 
outside of Europe. 523 
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GB012 added that: “By my estimate, we put in 5 million meters already which are pretty much 524 
old fashioned, and we’re putting in another 7 million meters that are nearly old fashioned.  525 
This is all resource intensive.” GB016 meanwhile posited that: “If you think of the in-home 526 
display and environmental impact, it’s another digital device in people’s homes, another thing 527 
that they don’t necessarily need that will be eventually recycled, managed and wasted.” The 528 
macro scale injustices of smart meters thus links to the globalized production of goods where 529 
material supply chains can be complex and untraceable (Bridge et al. 2018c).     530 
3.3 Norwegian electric vehicles 531 
 Our material in Norway identified micro scale environmental and social injustices in 532 
the form of increased traffic and pollution, a lack of parking spaces, a general growth of cars, 533 
and a lack of infrastructure in rural areas.  Meso scale injustices included the potential 534 
encroachment of roads into ecologically sensitive areas. Macro issues related to issues such 535 
as global waste streams, foreign resource extraction and industrial activity, and the exporting 536 
of second-hand cars.  537 
3.3.1 Micro injustices  538 
 Micro issues centered broadly on two topics, the environmental and social injustices 539 
of increased local car use (and thus corresponding emissions, congestion, parking, and 540 
reduced walking and physical activity) and the geographical exclusion caused by a lack of EV 541 
infrastructure in rural areas.  N015 explained the impacts of growth in EV use in urban areas:  542 
We have exponential growth in EV passenger cars in Norway and particularly in the 543 
bigger cities.  There is obviously a clear conflict down the line in that cities cannot take 544 
a higher number of cars and EVs which take exactly as much space as a diesel or fossil 545 
car.  546 
This issue also arose in the focus group: “If you move from public transport to EVs, then I can 547 
understand concerns about traffic, congestion, and parking in Oslo.  We could even see traffic 548 
increase to unsustainable levels.”  In the internet forums, one respondent noted they started 549 
driving more now that they had an EV, highlighting an unintended impact of EVs: 550 
Since EVs are clean and less polluting, I don’t feel so bad about using a car for short 551 
trips. This means that I tend to use the car (instead of a bike or a wheelchair) to go 552 
everywhere, even less than 1-2 km away. Even though deep down, I know that it is 553 
every bit as dangerous for pedestrians and cyclists as a fossil car. 554 
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As well as these issues resulting from the increase in EV use, N004 drew attention to the 555 
differentiated benefits – and potential exclusions – that currently appear inherent to the EV 556 
expansion in Norway, with certain rural geographical areas not benefitting as much from EVs 557 
as urban cities.  N011 emphasized the vulnerabilities related to rural (and winter) EV usage in 558 
Norway, touching on the contemporary and contentious issues of “range anxiety,” noting 559 
that “There is obviously a problem with electric mobility in the countryside.” Respondents in 560 
our internet forums agreed, noting: 561 
By far, the biggest issue with EVs is how to charge it up if you live in a place without a 562 
private parking spot or a charger. This is a difficult problem to solve.  Another issue is 563 
to have enough fast chargers when you drive long distance.  Occupied or broken 564 
chargers are a bigger problem than range anxiety. 565 
Another commented that: “The EV transition disenfranchises those who are not living in 566 
urbanized areas, because range is a big factor. So some rural people feel ‘left behind’ in this 567 
EV revolution.”  Essentially, this means that EVs may be good for taxi fleets and private 568 
companies in urban areas (see Figure 4) while being beyond the reach of most rural 569 
consumers. 570 
Figure 4: A Tesla Taxi in Trondheim, Norway, March 2018  571 
 572 
Source: Authors  573 
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The identification of these micro scale injustices highlights how socio-technical issues 574 
related to the roll-out of EVs and the development of supporting infrastructure have strong 575 
geographical dimensions. Indeed, respondents suggested that there is a profound urban-576 
rural divide between those who can benefit from EVs in cities and those who cannot take 577 
part in the transition but are left to drive polluting (and increasingly taxed) petrol cars in rural 578 
areas. 579 
3.3.2 Meso injustices   580 
Meso scale injustices of the EV transition in Norway related to how people reliant on 581 
public transport and fossil fuel cars are being hit with more national taxes – while also not 582 
being able to afford an EV. This came up in five interviews.  Another meso concern linked to 583 
debates around the expansion of roads, especially in ecologically sensitive and nationally 584 
protected areas. N007 argues here for example that the environmental credentials of EVs are 585 
being used to justify greater expansion of the road network:  586 
Norway … still has 94% of diesel and petrol cars. There are some politicians who think 587 
now that the environmental problems have been ‘solved’ with EVs and that we can do 588 
all other things, like build roads, which also harms the environment in other ways … In 589 
a way, EVs allow for the greenwashing of road building and expanding road transport 590 
… There are even plans to build a highway that stretches in areas of important nature 591 
and wetlands that have high environmental value. They have for example decided to 592 
go into a protected area near Lillehammer. Also, on the west coast they want to build 593 
a highway to Trondheim, to the whole west coast, over the fjords.  Many of the people 594 
who are pro this say that EVs make this less harmful for the environment.  595 
N011 meanwhile highlighted the problems related to road building in terms of increased 596 
national traffic, adding:  597 
Infrastructure for cars, including EVs, is one of the main reasons for the loss of 598 
biodiversity in Norway in general.  If you build more efficient roads you get more road 599 
traffic and … you get more of those problems with noise and dust from the road and 600 
plastics. Since the cars are still not fossil free in this transition period, we still increase 601 
our emissions by investing in more roads. 602 
The meso scale environmental injustice of using EVs as a justification for new road building 603 
plans shows how a benefit in one area (a less polluting car) can be used as to rationalize 604 
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policy in another area that leads to arguable ecological harm (biodiversity loss due to road 605 
building).  606 
3.3.3 Macro injustices  607 
Respondents lastly identified social and environmental macro scale issues such as 608 
waste flows generated by and externalities resulting from foreign manufacturing processes 609 
that underwrite Norwegian demand for EVs, as well as the exporting of ‘dirty’ (fossil fuel- 610 
powered) cars out of Norway.  611 
N001 noted this transnational link between the Norwegian EV and the extraction of 612 
necessary minerals in other countries: “EVs do directly have negative consequences in the 613 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and also Latin America [Argentina and Colombia] where 614 
lithium and cobalt come from.”  N006 reflected on some broader (and hitherto under-615 
studied) dimensions of the EV revolution in Norway: 616 
There are things with battery production that are of concern. Scarce materials, terrible 617 
working conditions for people in mines in the Congo where they have to get cobalt 618 
from. And the disposal of the batteries at the end.  There is a risk that this leads to 619 
environmental disasters somewhere else, so that we can drive around in clean cars in 620 
Norway only by exploiting even more poor workers in third world countries than we do 621 
today.  622 
Other respondents also touched on the problems related to battery manufacturing, 623 
including “severe” environmental impacts from mineral extraction and social impacts of using 624 
“child labor.”  N004 meanwhile highlighted the spatial justice trade-offs between Norway’s 625 
‘green’ consumption and the potentially ‘dirty’ production that occurs somewhere else: “EVs 626 
only make Norway green because they are produced somewhere else, and they are very 627 
energy intensive to manufacture.”  628 
Beyond the EV production process, N004 also connected EV use in Norway with the 629 
exporting of (soon-to-be-outlawed) fossil fueled cars, soon to be outlawed (Kass 2018), and 630 
second-hand cars towards jurisdictions with weaker environmental standards.  They 631 
speculated: 632 
The EV transition in Norway does create a risk that – we see that with computers and 633 
mobiles – the fossil fuel cars they are replacing are dumped in markets in developing 634 
countries for example at a cheap price and that is a risk to the environment and 635 
climate. 636 
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N011 noted that damaged EVs (and other cars, which have been displaced by EVs) can end 637 
up in foreign markets.  Figure 5 for example shows discarded European and Nordic vehicles 638 
and parts at a lot for sale in Accra, Ghana. 639 
Figure 5: Used European and Nordic cars (and car parts) for sale in Accra, Ghana, February, 640 
2019 641 
 642 
Source: Authors  643 
 These macro scale injustices highlight the potentially uneven nature of low carbon 644 
transitions, where benefits in one country can in fact result in injustices in others. Issues such 645 
as the use of child labor in cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo (e.g. Heffron, 646 
2018), poor environmental standards of battery production, and other nations possibly acting 647 
as waste grounds for old Norwegian fossil fuel cars, show how the Norwegian transition to 648 
EVs has far-reaching implications that are felt far beyond the borders of Norway. 649 
3.4 German solar panels 650 
 Our material on the solar PV transition in Germany highlighted the micro injustice of 651 
the exclusionary nature of investing in the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme and unemployment and 652 
labor issues at German solar firms; meso injustices such as the erosion of the market vitality 653 
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for nuclear power and coal; and macro injustices such as negative repercussions on 654 
neighboring countries Poland and the Czech Republic, threats to European electric utilities, 655 
the disruption of global fossil fuel markets, the extraction of raw materials, and poor working 656 
conditions at overseas manufacturers of solar equipment.    657 
3.4.1 Micro injustices 658 
 At the micro scale, respondents identified two main injustices: those unable to afford 659 
investment in the national solar feed-in tariff (FIT), and the impact of renewable energy 660 
transition on both coal miners and former solar manufacturing employees. 661 
 Although half of renewable energy is citizen-owned in Germany (Johnstone & Kivimaa 662 
2018), one stream of economic injustices that respondents drew attention to was the 663 
potentially uneven access among German citizens to solar resources and financing, with a 664 
focus group respondent noting plainly that: ”If you don’t have the money you can’t invest in 665 
the solar revolution.”  Considering that the consumers who have been able to benefit from 666 
generous subsidies are the ones who have been wealthy enough to afford the panel set-ups, 667 
in this light, the German solar transition could be seen as an example of the poor cross-668 
subsidizing the wealthy, good for community halls in wealthy areas (see Figure 6) but not 669 
accessible for those on low incomes. 670 
Figure 6: The Vauban community hall with solar PV, Germany, September 2018  671 
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 672 
Source: Authors  673 
This exclusionary aspect of solar energy was identified as also having geographical 674 
dimensions, with G006 observing that there may be interlocking meteorological and 675 
socioeconomic dimensions to the exclusion of some from solar, as it inevitably does not work 676 
well in less sunny areas or for those whose access to sunlight (and personal roof-space) is 677 
limited by the fact that they live in flats and apartments: 678 
Since we all know solar PV is powered by the sun, people living in places with fewer 679 
solar resources are at a disadvantage, or those living in buildings without [access to] a 680 
roof, or without a roof facing the right direction.  681 
There are further geographical dimensions to the injustices felt by some in Germany, with 682 
G001 claiming that populations in Eastern Germany, for example, feel resentment and anger 683 
towards the solar policy:  684 
In East Germany there is recent living memory of losing out, because of the closure of 685 
Eastern German industry and nothing coming to replace it. They feel that they are the 686 
victims and they regard the market, the government and its pro renewable energy 687 
policy as evil, making them victims. The idea that they are helping others get rich is 688 
entrenched. 689 
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For G005, resentment is sharpened further by the fact that coalminers are an already-690 
marginalized (and beleaguered) community within Germany:  691 
The high carbon fossil fuel industry is obviously and rightly threatened by solar energy, 692 
they lose their business model.  Other social costs include the closure of coal mines and 693 
coal power plants in eastern Germany … If these companies leave and the jobs leave, 694 
you need create credible solutions for these people to buy into a low carbon pathway. 695 
And this so far has not happened.  Instead, the beneficiaries of solar have been 696 
companies in the South of Germany, notably Freiburg in Baden-Württemberg.  697 
G008 reflected on the legacy impacts that Germany’s declined solar sector has had, 698 
particularly the fate of the large number of workers who lost their jobs following a bust in 699 
German solar manufacturing: 700 
Interestingly the real vulnerable group from the solar transition is not often talked 701 
about, namely 100,000 people who lost their jobs in the German solar sector over the 702 
past years. You have trade unions and government going, oh my goodness, we cannot 703 
shut down coal because of all the work and these regions. Yet Solar World and other 704 
big producers have shut down in the past years and they didn’t make a peep about 705 
those workers.  Workers in the German renewable energy sector are a vulnerable 706 
population. Some have poor labor conditions and terrible contracts. 707 
These micro scale injustices demonstrate the unevenness of the German solar PV transition 708 
in terms of who has been able to benefit – both temporally and spatially.  709 
3.4.2 Meso injustices 710 
At the meso scale, respondents cited the challenges that solar presents to centralized 711 
energy supply, and the impacts of Germany’s fading solar manufacturing boom. 712 
Decentralized solar PV has presented an inherent challenge to (incumbent) 713 
centralized power providers, especially nuclear operators, as well as coal-fired power 714 
stations. As G010 put it: “The nuclear industry in Germany has been suffering from the 715 
decision to phase in solar, and phase out nuclear. They are forced to explore options to sell 716 
overseas, given they no longer have a home market.”  717 
 Reflecting on the temporal specificity of Germany’s (since-faded) domestic solar 718 
manufacturing boom, some respondents argued that the solar transition has even (oddly) 719 
created risks for the market as a whole. G002 put this in the context of competition and 720 
bankruptcy for German firms:  721 
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Germany has changed the economic value chain for the solar industry, not necessarily 722 
for the better.  Solar panels are not produced anymore in Germany …. To compete, 723 
German manufacturers tried to decrease their prices. However, that was not really 724 
efficient then and they went bankrupt.  725 
G013 lastly noted that solar companies perhaps lost the most in the German transition due to 726 
a watering down of national policy and negative perceptions from financiers, in some cases 727 
leading to “many companies” going into “insolvency because the banks no longer finance 728 
solar projects.”   Consequently, it is apt to conclude that, in spite of it being considered a 729 
“success story” of state intervention, these gains are not permanent and indeed the German 730 
solar sector itself has not been immune from the changing nature of the transition and the 731 
whims of global markets (Meckling & Hughes 2018), which shape the national transition 732 
dynamics related to solar. 733 
3.4.3 Macro injustices  734 
At the macro level, respondents drew attention to several concerns with the solar PV 735 
transition in Germany, particularly negative impacts on Germany’s neighbors, and the 736 
negative economic impacts on global fossil fuel providers and the potential environmental 737 
and social impacts of the (overseas-based) panel production process. 738 
G010 framed the solar transition in terms of creating disruption to conventional 739 
energy suppliers across Europe: 740 
Some of the losers are the conventional utilities across Europe because their business 741 
model has been eroded: a strong increase of renewables erodes their market share, 742 
and also because of the access to the grid, thus making the baseload power plants not 743 
economic or workable, though they still have to be around to cope with situations 744 
when renewables cannot be relied up. 745 
G011 added that:  746 
Countries like Poland and the Czech Republic are angry about our solar transition 747 
because they are now suffering from cheap electricity imports from Germany.  Coal 748 
plants in Poland and nuclear plants in the Czech Republic have had to reduce output 749 
and sell less electricity because of cheaper exports from the German grid. 750 
In the focus group, respondents stated that the German experience may have even created a 751 
negative stigma against future investments in a European solar industry: “The main negative 752 
to the solar transition is the loss of the companies who wanted to manufacture solar panels 753 
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but have shut down. The lesson appears to be it is difficult to make a profit doing solar in 754 
Europe.”  755 
 As per impacts on global fossil fuel providers G001 argued that, although this would 756 
not be seen as a bad outcome by many, fossil fuel states and companies themselves are 757 
nonetheless set for huge disruptions as a result of the German (and global) PV transition: 758 
The people who benefit from the fossil fuel industry are the biggest losers. I do not feel 759 
sorry for them, because it is like the drug dealer complaining about losing his business, 760 
or the burglar.  But there is logic in the claim that they are losers to the German 761 
transition … Petrol states like Venezuela, which is going bankrupt, could be vulnerable 762 
as global oil markets shrink.  Canadian oil sands is in a similar category. 763 
G003 concurred with this analysis, noting “countries who export coal like Australia or South 764 
Africa are at risk, as well as oil and gas producing countries, especially in the long run. In other 765 
countries like China and India, you will see a huge growth of carbon intensive technologies to 766 
produce energy, so they could lose out also when renewables disrupt those markets.”  These 767 
apparent threats to incumbent sectors seem apt given that Germany is rapidly electrifying 768 
transport (meaning solar can begin to “substitute” for oil) (Canzler et al. 2017) and that it 769 
currently still imports 55.2 million tons of coal per year, or 93 percent of its hard coal 770 
consumed (Amelang and Wettengel 2018: 1).  771 
 Other respondents meanwhile focused on the materialities of the solar industry itself, 772 
questioning the ethical and justice issues entangled in raw material extraction and 773 
manufacturing processes in jurisdictions with weak social and environmental protections 774 
(Mulvaney 2013, 2014).  As G004 states, “If you take a broad perspective, you have to 775 
question where Germany gets its solar modules from, where are the resources such as copper 776 
and raw materials coming from.  That has an impact on the countries where these raw 777 
materials are excavated, and working conditions for people working in the countries making 778 
solar panels are certainly affected … In China, we do not know under what conditions workers 779 
manufacture the models.”  Sovacool and D’Agostino (2011) for instance note that solar 780 
manufacturing costs in China are sometimes kept artificially low by using low-wage labor. 781 
G008 articulated a broader critique of Germany’s solar (or any type of renewable 782 
energy) transition, drawing attention to the inherent imbalances and inequities built into the 783 
global political economy that may inevitably create injustices somewhere:  784 
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Renewable electricity such as solar is underpinned by destructive political economy 785 
just like any other industrial processes.  Even renewables still destroy the Earth. Which 786 
is why you cannot talk about a truly renewable energy transition, you need to also talk 787 
about reducing general material throughput, or degrowth.  Otherwise, the production 788 
of renewable energies relies on the extraction on raw materials and resources around 789 
the world. And they are not extracted in socially responsible and environmentally 790 
sustainable ways. 791 
As with macro level injustices highlighted in previous sections, those pertaining to the 792 
German PV transition therefore relate strongly to the question marks that hang over the 793 
global production chains of mineral extraction, production processes and waste, and the 794 
ultimate unevenness built into the system that makes economic activity cheaper in one place 795 
compared with another.   796 
4. Discussion: Spatiality and temporality in whole-systems injustices  797 
When taken collectively, our interviews, focus groups, and internet forums identified 798 
44 different injustices.   In this section, we assess the spatiality and temporality of these 799 
impacts.   800 
4.1 The spatiality of injustices  801 
 As predicted by our whole systems approach, justice impacts span spatial scales – 802 
from micro, meso, to macro – across the modes of production, manufacturing, consumption, 803 
and waste disposal. These are illustrated below in Table 2. Most injustices—19 in total—804 
occur at the micro scale but a compelling number also span the meso scale (11 in total) and 805 
the macro scale (14 in total). 806 
Table 2: Summary of spatial scales of injustices for four low-carbon transitions  807 
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(7) Exclusion of rural 
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added stress for families 
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(12) Increased car use 
leading to congestion, 
(13) pollution, (14) 
parking problems, (15) 
avoidance of 
walking/cycling, and (16) 
lack of infrastructure in 
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public transport 
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into environmentally 
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national policy  
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(17) Exclusionary nature 
of the feed-in tariff, (18) 
local closure of German 
coal mines (19) Loss of 
solar manufacturing jobs 
(9) Threat to centralized 
energy supply models,  
(10) stigmatizing future 
solar investment and the 
loss of German solar 
manufacturing (11) poor 
employment conditions or 
standards at German 
manufacturers  
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markets for electricity 
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(12) disruption of 
global fossil fuel 
industries, (13) 
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materials and waste 
flows, (14) poor 
working conditions at 
overseas solar 
manufacturers  
Source: Authors. 808 
Impacts of European energy transitions are thus not limited to or contained by the 809 
boundaries of the country undergoing the low-carbon transition, but are interwoven in 810 
complex multi-scalar webs of cause and effect. Many of the injustices identified occur at the 811 
macro scale well beyond Europe, and effectively amount to a spatial externalization of 812 
deleterious environmental and social effects – with the (invariably Northern) countries mainly 813 
enjoying positive effects of their low-carbon policies, but invariably Southern countries 814 
bearing the costs.  Figure 7 maps these out globally, from the lithium mines of South America 815 
to the cobalt mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and from the e-waste 816 
scrapyards of Ghana to the low-wage manufacturing centers in China.  As Bridge et al. (2013: 817 
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335) observe, the perverse effect of the gravitation of “clean” energy technology 818 
manufacturing to countries such as China has been that this production now takes place 819 
largely in “a region with a higher carbon intensity of production.” Such a dynamic 820 
perpetuates a process of social peripheralisation, whereby proliferating streams of pollution 821 
and waste end up in countries that cannot afford to refuse the financial compensation of 822 
bearing a high environmental and health risk. 823 
Figure 7: The spatiality of European energy injustices    824 
 825 
Source: Authors  826 
In our cases, the French nuclear transition clearly externalizes energy and carbon-827 
intensive processes such as uranium mining, milling, and fuel enrichment to other countries 828 
in North America, Asia, Africa and Australasia (Poirson 2012), and our respondents accused 829 
France of flooding European neighbors with cheap power that has stymied their own energy 830 
transitions.  The British smart meter transition has meanwhile generated electronic and 831 
hazardous waste streams that could be exported to countries in the Global South (Sovacool 832 
et al. 2018), and it also has resulted in carbon emissions related to the fairly inefficient nature 833 
of smart meter installations (Holifield et al. 2017).  The Norwegian EV transition depends on 834 
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material inputs such as cobalt, lithium and copper that are produced in areas with weak 835 
human and environmental safeguards (e.g. the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see Rustad 836 
et al., 2016), and it is also generating waste streams for used batteries and second-hand 837 
vehicles (Manzetti, & Mariasiu 2015; Winslow et al. 2018). The German solar transition 838 
similarly requires raw materials produced in unstable regions of the world, and depends on 839 
low-wage factory workers in countries such as China for manufacturing and assembling 840 
modules (Aman et al. 2015).  841 
These extra-territorial dimensions are troubling as they suggest that low-carbon 842 
transitions achieve some of their low-carbon or “clean” elements merely by outsourcing 843 
injustices (such as “dirty” production) elsewhere (Sovacool 2016). They also illustrate clearly 844 
how “energy production, consumption and policy-making decisions in one place can cause 845 
hidden but harmful, multi-dimensional, socio-environmental injustices in others” (Healy et 846 
al., 2019: 230). 847 
4.2 The temporality of injustices  848 
 Another noteworthy dimension to the injustices of low-carbon transitions is their 849 
temporality, both in terms of lifecycle impacts as well as the timing of benefits and the inter-850 
generational nature of the negative impacts. Table 3 illustrates injustices distributed across 851 
the temporal moments of the technological lifecycle and utilization by consumers. As is 852 
evident, 11 injustices were identified at the production stage, 23 at the consumption stage, 853 
and 8 at the waste disposal stage. 854 
Table 3: Summary of lifecycle stages of injustices for four low-carbon transitions  855 
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national policy 
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solar panels  
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at German 
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flows, 
(11) Poor working 
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power plants 
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solar investment and the 
bankruptcy of German 
solar firms 
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 (10) Extraction of 
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Source: Authors  856 
In line with a widening focus in the energy justice literature (e.g. Jenkins et al. 2014), 857 
the justices identified are dispersed across the lifecycle of low carbon energy transitions. 858 
Many of the injustices related to the extraction of minerals that are used in low carbon 859 
technology manufacturing and to the disposal of obsolescent materials (Mulvaney 2013; 860 
Cross et al. 2018). These also ally with the injustices identified in Table 2 at the “macro” scale, 861 
showing how negative impacts on communities are often perceived as being “externalized.” 862 
In France’s case the disposal of waste materials within the country means that these impacts 863 
are felt closer to home. The majority of injustices however occur however within the 864 
consumption phase of the life cycle, in line with other research on low carbon technologies 865 
and energy justice (e.g. Sovacool et al. 2017b; Sovacool et al. 2019; Xu and Chen 2019). These 866 
relate to injustices generated by various aspects of the rollout of technologies, resulting 867 
largely from policy decisions over transition design that inadvertently disadvantage certain 868 
social groups or economic actors. 869 
As well as being dispersed across the life-cycle, within the production, consumption, 870 
and disposal stages, injustices were also identified across and between generations,. Indeed, 871 
inter-generational impacts on future generations were mentioned directly in the interviews, 872 
and they are perhaps the starkest for nuclear power, given the long-lived nature of its waste 873 
streams (Taebi et al. 2012). As F001 reflected, “There are clear inter-generational equity 874 
issues with nuclear power … And yet we tend to accept these, or ignore them, due to the post 875 
war culture of a brave new way forward". F004 similarly stated that: “Any discussion of justice 876 
must focus on fairness from the perspective of the local territory that will be hosting nuclear 877 
facilities. And you must also discuss the fairness towards future generations that will have to 878 
deal with that burden.”   879 
A different temporal dynamic was at work within the British smart meter program—880 
with those adopting first generation (SMETS1) meters suffering from lost functionality if they 881 
switched suppliers (see Figure 8), saddling these customers with an inferior technology.  882 
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 891 
Source: Authors 892 
Norwegian EVs have articulated contrasting temporal dimensions, with early adopters 893 
deriving the lion’s share of benefits; and later-adopters enjoying fewer and suffering from 894 
traffic congestion from the former. As N003 explained: “The more people that have EV, the 895 
fewer the benefits for drivers. You have to take away some of these benefits eventually, 896 
everyone cannot be allowed to drive on bus lanes. Once you have too many EVs, they fill up.”    897 
This same dynamic was evident in Germany, with early adopters of solar PV deriving 898 
the greatest benefits. As a respondent in our focus group iterated: “The German feed-in tariff 899 
for solar was more profitable 18 years ago, but not now.”  900 
Consequently, the injustices have different temporal dynamics in how, or more 901 
precisely when, they are experienced.   Figure 9 shows that some proximate impacts are 902 
more immediate, they are experienced already, in the “now,” or soon, generally within the 903 
next five years.  This includes many injustices such as parking and traffic congestion (for EVs), 904 
flows of e-waste and fuel poverty (for smart meters), local pollution and community health 905 
(French nuclear), and closure of coal mines and rising costs with the feed-in tariff (German 906 
solar energy). However, other injustices will be experienced more intermediately in the 907 
future, roughly in the next ten to fifty years. This would include the future displacement of 908 
fossil fuel or “dirty” cars from Norway to other countries as they are substituted by EVs, or a 909 
future decline in property prices that could result from new French nuclear power plants, or 910 
further incidents and accidents. The impacts of national and transnational disruption of 911 
future energy transitions would also occur on this scale, as well as the continued exportation 912 
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of technology from Europe abroad and continual instability on fossil fuel business models.  A 913 
very particular set of injustices are extremely distant or long-lived, extending well into the 914 
future. This includes temporal injustice that could span hundreds of years to even 1000 years, 915 
such as the need to manage radioactive waste and mine tailings, or to recover from the 916 
fallout of severe nuclear accidents. 917 
Figure 9:  The proximate, intermediate, and distant temporalities of energy injustices 918 
 919 
Source: Authors  920 
5. Conclusion and Implications  921 
 In sum, the whole systems energy justice analysis presented here demands we better 922 
understand, account for, and attempt to minimize the ways in which European (and other) 923 
low-carbon transitions can give rise to, and then systematize, injustices – across social 924 
segments, spatial scales, and temporalities.    925 
The injustices associated with European low-carbon transitions—summarized in 926 
Figure 10—transcend scales (micro, meso, macro) and lifecycle stages (of production and 927 
distribution, consumption, and waste disposal and recycling).  In this way, a French 928 
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restaurant using nuclear electricity to bake croissants connects with a worker inhaling toxic 929 
fumes at a uranium mine in Niger or Canada, from where nearly half of France’s uranium 930 
imports come from.  A British household using their smart meter and in-home display to 931 
monitor their laundry is generating electronic waste that could end up in the fields and farms 932 
of Ghana.  A parent picking up their children from school in an electric vehicle in Norway 933 
depends in part on the backbreaking labor of mineral extraction across lithium and cobalt 934 
mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  A German solar panel supporting a 935 
pensioner’s retirement in Berlin may have been manufactured at a low-wage factory in 936 
China.   937 
 938 
 Figure 10: Whole systems energy justice impacts of European low-carbon transitions  939 
 940 
 941 
However, Figure 10 also reveals some of the limitations to a “whole systems” 942 
approach, insofar as the micro, meso, and macro scales do not always map evenly or 943 
systematically onto the different lifecycle stages of each low-carbon transition, and vice 944 
versa.  Instead, the interactions between scales and stages is dynamic and more 945 
heterogeneous than the analytical categories themselves imply.   For instance, we identified 946 
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issues such as waste and water pollution with French nuclear power as “micro” concerns, as 947 
they affect local communities the most directly, but in aggregate those aspects could become 948 
serious national concerns over time.  We identified increased carbon emissions from the 949 
inefficient, supplier-led smart meter rollout as “meso” concerns, affecting the national 950 
carbon balance, but emissions from installation vehicles could also contribute to local particle 951 
pollution (“micro”) and contribute to global warming (“macro”).  We classified unequal and 952 
elitist tax policy in Norway as “meso,” a nationwide issue, even though it intersects strongly 953 
with ‘micro’ household dynamics; inversely, we classified unequal access to solar energy in 954 
Germany as ‘micro’, for affecting households, even though this inequality is embedded in 955 
national policy.    956 
Moreover, these injustices are inherently relational and may be experienced 957 
differently by different people in different places at distinct times, and sometimes negative 958 
impacts can be unexpected or unintended. For instance, what some perceive as an injustice 959 
or direct and severe harm may be experienced by others as a mere nuisance or 960 
inconvenience, and vice versa.  Thus, as Castán-Broto and Baker (2018: 3) argue, “energy is 961 
bound up with the reproduction of uneven patterns of development and access” that are not 962 
“pre-existing, fixed” categories, but are “actively constituted through social and material 963 
relations.”  Some identified injustices, such as nuclear waste or the fallout from a nuclear 964 
accident, could last hundreds of years to millennia; others such as unemployment or traffic 965 
congestion, could be more transient and temporary.   966 
In terms of concrete policy recommendations, our study does point towards a 967 
multitude of actions that planners can take at any of the scales we examine.  At the “micro” 968 
scale, local content requirements or benefit-sharing agreements (demanding that project or 969 
technology developers use local materials and labor and/or share more benefits with 970 
communities) can help address some of the distributive inequalities that arise related to 971 
displacement and unemployment.  Similarly, such actions could improve the legitimacy of the 972 
transition in the eyes of affected parties and culminate in a broader social license to operate.  973 
At the “meso” scale, planners and parliamentarians could hold public referendums on the 974 
transition in question, to solicit public feedback about concerns, and erect statutes that 975 
better track or account for embodied emissions and lifecycle impacts.  At the “macro” scale, 976 
groups like the International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency, and 977 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are well positioned to recognize and account for 978 
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embodied global externalities, e.g. carbon, water, and land use but also perhaps waste, toxic 979 
pollution, and metals—across different energy systems. Moreover, improved transparency 980 
about raw materials and waste streams would be beneficial, just as the Extractive Industries 981 
Transparency Initiative has attempted in the oil and gas sector, or the World Commission on 982 
Dams has done in the hydropower sector.  Furthermore, the longevity and often complicated 983 
legacy of energy transitions indicates a need for whole systems thinking at the technical and 984 
policy design stage, when they consider policy processes and responses to transitions. 985 
 We do not believe our findings undermine the overarching rationale for low-carbon 986 
transitions, nor do they suggest that the four specific transitions we examined should have 987 
been abandoned. However, based on our findings, and new theorizations of whole systems 988 
energy injustice, planners, policymakers, practitioners, and researchers should nonetheless 989 
become more cognizant of the potential for low-carbon transitions to create new – and 990 
worsen preexisting – patterns of exploitation and inequality. The specific critiques we raise, 991 
some of them sobering, are aimed at a target: improving and learning so that vulnerability in 992 
low-carbon transitions is minimized, benefits and burdens are made more visible, and the 993 
potential gains are distributed more fairly and according to representative processes.  994 
Dealing with the spatial and temporal whole systems nature of energy justice is thus as 995 
necessary as it is demanding.  996 
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